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MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CIA

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support for Psychological Warfare

Problem: To develop and agree on a clear delineation of functional responsibilities for the intelligence support for Psychological Warfare - including the element of leadership.

Recommendation: In order to permit further discussion and clarification of the ideas of this paper at the staff level, it is recommended that no firm commitment be made at this time but that the following language be approved for inclusion as paragraph 21 of the National PW Plan:

"In accordance with general principles to be worked out between the NPSB and the heads of the five intelligence agencies, the CIA will see that appropriate intelligence support is provided for psychological warfare and that the intelligence activities of government departments and agencies in this field are properly coordinated."

Discussion: Seven separable needs of psychological warfare for intelligence support have been identified:

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1. Spot Intelligence

Information that reaches the intelligence agency spontaneously, without specifically being requested. It reports a recent happening and may be derived from any one of a number of covert, official, or published sources.

Issue:

Should the identification, evaluation and dissemination of spot intelligence for psychological warfare use be centralized (probably in O/CI) or remain decentralized?

With only a few exceptions, which are unimportant for Psychological Warfare purposes, all spot information is at present being received in each of the five intelligence agencies. The time of receipt in each does not differ appreciably. It is believed that personnel requirements would not vary significantly if the function were centralized. There is, however, one important factor which weighs against centralization: In order to do the best job of identifying spot intelligence of use for Psychological Warfare, the analysts would have to know in detail exactly what each operating agency was doing and planning. This close relationship would be facilitated if the analysts were in the same agency with the operators.

2. Reports

Papers written in the field or in Washington to describe the foreign reaction to an important event or to report on the general state of public opinion in a particular area or group.

- 9 The reports prepared in the field should reach all five agencies and would be evaluated by each. Those prepared in Washington might appropriately be produced by State or CIA or G-2, etc., depending on the area or group discussed. A certain proportion of these reports would be broad enough and important enough to warrant substantive coordination among the interested agencies. Most of them will be useful for political purposes, but would not be written were it not for the need for them for Psychological Warfare.

Issue:

Is special machinery needed to coordinate these reports?

The chief negative argument is that there is nothing special about these reports but that they are the kind of papers the agencies produce anyway and, if necessary, coordinate on an ad hoc basis.

The counter argument is that if there is no designated official to exercise leadership and no readily available standard means of discussing these reports, many will not be written at all and others will not be properly coordinated.

3. Analysts

These are closely akin to reports and may at times be combined in the same paper. They analyze the situation depicted in the reports and identify the points of vulnerability to psychological attack. In order for the various operating agencies to coordinate their activities most effectively, they must be supplied with coordinated intelligence advice (cf. IAC support for the NSC).

Issue:

To what extent should intelligence try to point out the targets for psychological attack?

In the political field intelligence properly shrinks from pointing the way to policy makers. In military operations, however, a good G-2 points out the enemy positions and possible plans and indicates where he is weak. This difference is understandable because of the greater detail required by the military commander and the rapidity with which the situation changes.

To transfer this reasoning to the field of Psychological Warfare, it might be concluded that intelligence has no part in identifying psychological "objectives" or "tasks" but that it could assist with regard to the more detailed "themes" and should make an important contribution toward selecting sub-themes for the operators.

4. Estimates

What is the likelihood of a given change in the attitudes of a particular group or area? What would be the psychological results of a proposed policy or anticipated event?

Issue:

Would any psychological estimates be required other than as a part of a national estimate?

If NIE's produced in the usual manner contain a section on the psychological elements involved, there would seem to be no need for separate so-called psychological estimates. If the subject is not important enough for a national estimate, it is

doubtful if any formal estimate beyond the opinions of the appropriate operating and policy officials is required.

5. Research

Most research studies in direct support of psychological Warfare activities fall into the general field of political, sociological and cultural intelligence, for which primary responsibility has been turned over to the State Department. A very small percentage of the research work on a particular paper may fall in the military or scientific fields.

Issues:

a. Should the State Department assume responsibility to coordinate with other agencies in the production of research studies?

In view of the fact that the Department is doing most of the work itself and would as a normal procedure want the contributions of other agencies in their fields of specialization, it seems logical for the State Department to be responsible for the coordination of research for Psychological Warfare. There is no need for the CIA to act as a channel between the State Department and the other agencies.

b. Should CIA be required to check the substance of the research studies prepared in State to ensure against inaccuracies and bias?

The decision on this point has already been made with the abolition of ORE.

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6. External Research

Longer range, more extensive projects which can most effectively be farmed out to government or private research organizations.

Issue:


How can the efforts of the various government organizations engaged in directing external research in the psychological field be best coordinated?

Theoretically external research should be coordinated as such without reference to whether it is being undertaken for Psychological Warfare or not. There are those, however, who despair of making sense in this field and argue that external research of use in Psychological Warfare is a more manageable bundle and in the interest of results should be treated separately.

This problem requires further study.

7. Technical

This is a special kind of intelligence concerned with the physical problems of transmission and jamming. It is dealt with in NSC 66/1 and should probably not be taken up here at the present time. It is mentioned only for the sake of completeness.

  
JAMES Q. REBER  
Acting Assistant Director  
Intelligence Coordination

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Informal comment on draft paper, Subject: Intelligence Support for Psychological Warfare (Possible memo from James Q. Reber, Acting Assistant Director, Intelligence Coordination to Deputy Director, CIA)

1. Possible additional "separable need of psychological warfare for intelligence support":

The collection, declassification and dissemination to psychological warfare operators of "raw materials" for propaganda use.

Example:  soviet anti-religious activities.

2. Comment on Point 1. Spot Intelligence

The counter argument may be that spot intelligence is of little use to psychological warfare officer, whether engaged in policy making, program planning, or in the actual production of propaganda materials, until it is collated, evaluated and summarized in the form of reports on given subjects of general interest and usefulness. To have the same spot intelligence being sifted and summarized by five different intelligence agencies for much the same purpose presumably would result in waste and probably would result in the neglect of spot intelligence by one or more of the agencies who would find it impossible to allocate positions for this collation and summarization function.

Note: May be talking here of different kind of intelligence from that intended by the draft paper under reference.

3. Comment on Point 3. Analyses

With specific reference to the last paragraph of the discussion under this point, the opposite would appear more likely.

Intelligence for psychological warfare or propaganda, as for the military, should report the situation, enemy weaknesses, enemy plans, etc. The psych-war policy-maker should decide what weapons (themes) to use and in what force they should be used to meet the

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situation. The latter determination usually is made with considerable reference to detailed U.S. political, economic and foreign policy factors not always known to intelligence staffs.

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CIA - MR. Allen ~~Wicks~~  
Room 2003 M. Bldg.

The notes I made as I read the draft you left with me have been typed for what they're worth to you. They are inclosed together with the draft which you asked be returned. I was glad to have the opportunity to talk with you and hope we can keep in touch...

JH Evans  
PRS - State Dept

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